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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND BUD GRANT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CASSIE F. JONES, Admini-
stratrix of the Estate of 
Marvin LaMar Jones, also 
known as Marvin L. Jones, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12481 
BRIEF 0'F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff seeking a reconvey-
ance from the estate of one Marvin LaMar Jones, now de-
rPased, of certain land and water stock certificates pre-
,·ionsl ~· conveyed and transferred by Plaintiff to said 
decedent, for an ae-0ounting of the sums received by the 
decedent from the sale of a part of said land and stock, 
and for a money judgment in the amount of the sums so 
received. The Defendant amended her answer with leave 
of Court, claiming a set-off for amounts expended by she 
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and her decedent on the mortgage, taxes, sewer and water 
liens and assessments against the land and stock. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LffWER COURT 
The trial court ordered a reconveyance to Plaintiff 
of the land and water stock not previously sold by Marrin 
LaMar Jones, which reconveyance was subject to the 
mortgage lien agains said land. The Court further 
awarded Plaintiff judgment for $3,000.00 an acre, with 
interest, for the eight acres of the subject land sold by 
Marvin LaMar Jones to the State of Utah and for the 
amount, together with interest thereon, received by said 
decedent from his sale of 25 shares of the water stock. 
An off-set of $12, 708.00, with interest tlwreon, was 
awarded Defendant for payments made in keeping cur-
rent the liens and assignments against the land and 
stock, resulting in a money judgment to Plaintiff in an 
amount of $20,200.62. Defendant moved the Court to 
amend the judgment, or in the alternative, for a new trial 
on part of the issues. The motion for a new trial was 
denied and the judgment was amended, in part, reducing 
the money judgment awarded to Plaintiff to an amount 
of $18,955.00, less the total amount of any payments 
thereafter paid by Defendant upon the mortgage loan 
then against the land. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a determination that the evidence 
before the trial court was not sufficient to support the 
trial court's finding that the Plaintiff was to receive a 
net amount of $3,000.00 per acre from the proceeds of the 
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8ale to the State of Utah of the eight acres of the subject 
land so sold, but rather, that the evidence showed that 
from the amount to have been received, Plaintiff was to 
make payments of the sum necessary to procure a partial 
release of the mortgage against said land. 
Defendant further seeks a reversal of the trial 
eomt's denial of her motion for a new trial of the issue 
of the Plaintiff's obligation to make the payment neces-
sary to procure the partial release of mortgage. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and the Defendant's decedent, Marvin La-
Mar Jones, had been business and social acquaintances 
over a number of years. (R. 99, 100, 102, 112) During 
this time, Plaintiff was purchasing certain land and 
water stock under a real estate contract, (R. 120) which 
land is situated at approximately 3010 East 7000 South 
Rtreet in Salt Lake County and is more particularly de-
scribed by the plat and warranty deed admitted by the 
trial court as exhibits 1-P and 4-P, respectively. (R. 95, 
%. 98, 124) Over the years between approximately 1959 
and 1964, a number of attempts were made by the Plain-
tiff working in cooperation with Marvin Jones and a real 
rstate broker, Myrna Mae Nebeker, to sell or lease the 
subject land, but all such attempts failed. (R. 110, 113) 
Part of the land was comprised of gravel deposits (R. 
l 25) and it was finally decided that these deposits should 
hl' sold. (R. 113) The Plaintiff had incurred a number of 
obligations against the property (R. 144, 120, 121) and 
it had been indicated that lien releases would not be 
given for the gravel deposits without full payment of the 
obligations being first made. (R. 122) It was decided 
that the Plaintiff should refinance the property in order 
to liquidate existing encumbrances and acquire a new 
mortgage under which partial mortgage releases could 
be obtained as individual parcels of the land were sold. 
(R. 123) 
The Plaintiff and Marvin Jones, acting under the 
assumption that the Plaintiff's financial situation was 
such that he would be unable to obtain a loan in his own 
name, orally agreed (R. 126) that Plaintiff would deed 
the land to Jones who would apply for and carry a mort-
gage loan in his name, giving the subject land as security. 
(R. 122) It was agreed that the plaintiff would make all 
mortgage payments on the loan to be so obtained (R. 121, 
122, 130) and after the loan had been repaid, would re-
ceive a reconveyance from Mervin Jones of any portion 
of the land not sold. (R. 122) 
On August 6, 1964, a warranty deed was executed 
by Plaintiff conveying the subject land and water stock 
to Marvin Jones. (Ex 4-P, R. 114) A loan was thereupon 
obtained by Marvin Jones from State Savings and Loan 
Association (R. 120) in exchange for a mortgage given 
by Marvin Jones on the land which he had received from 
the Plaintiff. 
On or about October 26, 1966, Marvin Jones sold and 
conveyed to the State of Utah approximately eight acres 
of gravel deposits located on the subject property (R. 72, 
150) for which he received an amount of $46,625.00 (R. 
72) and from which an amount of $20,000.00 was paid to 
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State Savings and Loan Association to procure a release 
of the mortgage against the particular acreage sold. 
(R. 105, 183) Marvin Jones retained the balance of the 
sales proceeds. (R. 103) The Plaintiff did not at any 
time pay any amounts on the mortgage loan, (R. 122, 
131) all such payments having been made by Marvin 
Jones during his lifetime, and thereafter, by the Defend-
ant. (R. 131, 162) 
Marvin Jones died on November 8, 1966, shortly 
after the subject sale to the State of Utah had been com-
pleted. (R. 101) The Defendant, qualifying as surviving 
spouse of the decedent, was appointed Administratrix of 
his estate on March 7, 1967. (R. 101, 102, 107) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A 
NET AMOUNT OF $24,000.00 FROM THE PRO-
CEEDS ON THE SALE OF THE GRAVEL LAND TO 
THE STATE OF UTAH, BECAUSE: 
A. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
'l'he design and purpose of the subject action is two-
fold. First, to establish in the Plaintiff an interest in 
property, legal title to which is vested in Defendant. 
tlecond, to obtain reimbursement of the proceeds derived 
hy Defendant's decedent from the sale of part of that 
propert_\'. In other words, to establish that the property 
\\'as lwld and administered by Defendant and her de-
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cedent for the benefit of the Plaintiff - that the De-
fendant and her decedent were "constn1ctive trustees" 
for Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff's action is grounded in equity. He held 
at best only an equitable title in the property subject of 
his complaint and as provided at 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, 
Sec. 63, " ... an equitable title is not the basis of a rem-
edy in a court of law". The constructive trust, which in 
essence is the remedy sought to be imposed, is an equit-
able remedy. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212; 209 P. 2d 
229; 54 Am. J ur., '11 rusts, Sec. 218. Furthermore, the 
Plaintiff's demand for an award of legal title in the land 
is one in equity. This Court said in Richins v. Struhs, 17 
Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314: 
"It should be noted that this attempt to assert and 
establish an interest in land, the legal title to 
which is vested in another, is a proceeding in equi-
ty." (Emphasis added) 17 Utah 2d 358 
This Court has historically recognized its authority 
and responsibility as imposed by Article YIII, Section 9, 
of the Utah Constitution, to review the evidence beforf' 
the trial court in equity cases for the purpose of deter-
mining whether it preponderates in favor of the trial 
court judgment. In reviewing the evidence before the 
equity court in Nokes v. Continental Mining and Milling 
Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954, the Court held: 
"vVhere there is conflict in the evidence, the find-
ing of the trial court will not be disturbe~ if. the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the finding; 
6 
nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly balanced or 
it is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor, 
even if its weight is slightly against the finding of 
the trial court, but it will be overturned and an-
other finding made only if the evidence clearf;y 
preponderates against his finding." (Emphasis 
added) 6 -Ctah 2d 178 & 179. 
The Court below found that the Plaintiff was to 
have received a net amount of $3,000.00 an acre for the 
eight acres af the subject land sold by Marvin Jones to 
the State of Utah. The Defendant was accordingly or-
Mn·d to pay to Plaintiff an amount of $24,000.00 from 
the l>roceeds of that sale. The Defendant submits that 
the preponderance of the evidence clearly indicates 
that Plaintiff and Marvin Jones had agreed that the 
$20,000.00 paid to State Savings and Loan Association, 
to obtain a release of the mortgage on the acreage so 
:;old, was to have been paid by Plaintiff from the 
$24,000.00 proceeds which he was to have received from 
the sale. The only evidence given at trial with respect to 
this issne was the testimony of Plaintiff's witness, Myrna 
Nebeker. She testified on direct examination: 
"First of fall, we were working on selling eight 
acres of the gravel land, and the agreement was 
reached that Bud was to receive the first - I 
believe, it was $3,000.00 per acre of land for the 
land that would get sold. From that point, what-
ever the sale price would be, Marv would take the 
expenses and would receive the difference be-
tween the amount to go to Bud and the amount of 
the actual sales price, less expenses, whatever 
that might turn out to be." (R.121, 122) 
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equity in the exact amount of the payment made. There 
is no effect or change in his net worth. In the instant 
case, the Plaintiff had agreed to make all mortgage pay-
ments. (R. 121, 122, 130) Therefore, by making the prin-
cipal payment necessary to procure the partial release 
of mortgage, he would be increasing his equity in the 
remaining land to the extent of the amount of the pay-
ment made. He would only be exchanging cash for equity 
of a like amount. 'l'here would be no change in his net 
worth by virtue of his having made the payment from 
the $24,000.00 ($3,000.00 per acre - 8 acres) received as 
his share of the proceeds of the sale. 
Mrs. N ebeker's further testimony sheds light on the 
question of who was to make the payment to procure the 
pal'tial release of mortgage. Her testimony clearly indi-
cated that the b·alance owing on the mortgage was not to 
have been completely paid off at the time of the sale of 
the gravel land. She testified: 
"Q. Do you know, Mrs. Nebeker, whether or not 
the remaining mortgage balance was to be paid 
from the three thousand per acre amount that the 
Plaintiff was to receive from the sale of the gravel 
land 1 (Emphasis added) 
A. No. It wasn't. I am having problems with 
-. " (R. 133) 
The testimony of this witness leaves no doubt as to 
who was responsible to make the payments on the mort-
gage loan. 
"Q. And was there any discussion at which M~. 
Jones and Mr. Grant were present as to how this 
loan was to be repaid f 
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Direct examination of Mrs. Nebeker continued: 
"Q. _Correct me if I am wrong, Mrs. Nebeker, your 
testimony was, your recollection was that Mr. 
Grant was to receive the first $3,000.00 an acre 
for any of that gravel land that was sold? 
A. To the best of my recollection, that was the 
agreement. 
Q. And who was to pay all the expenses of the 
sale? 
A. Marv." (R. 126) 
The subject testimony clearly indicates that the 
Plaintiff was to realize $3,000.00 an acre for the acreage 
sold by Marvin Jones and that Jones was to retain the 
balance of the sales proceeds after paying the expenses 
of the sale. The testimony is not, however, dispositive of 
the question as to the nature of the expenses of sale con-
templated by the parties. 
A sales expense is by that definition an expense 
incurred incident to a sale. In other words, an obligation 
which would not have been incurred, but for the making 
of the sale. Sales commissions, escrow fees, costs for 
preparation and recording of documents of conveyance 
are clearly expenses incident to the sale of real property. 
But for the making of that sale, they would not be in· 
curred. However, the issue here is whether a payment 
of principle on a mortgage balance is such an expense. 
Such a payment represents only an accelerated payment 
of an obligation already owed - an obligation which 
must be paid regardless of the sale. It is not an expense. 
The mortgagor realizes an automatic increase in his 
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The Defendant respectfully submits that the clear 
preponderance of the testimony before the trial court 
indicates that the amount paid to procure a partial re-
lease of mortgage from State Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation was to have been paid from the $24,000.00 which 
represented the Plaintiff's share of the sale proceeds. In 
other words, that the $20,000.00 paid to State Savings 
was to have been deducted from the $24,000.00 allocated 
to the Plaintiff, who was properly only to have received 
a net of $4,000.00 cash from the sale. The finding of 
the trial court with regard to this issue is against the 
clear preponderance of the evidence and the finding and 
the judgment thereon should be modified awarding to 
Plaintiff only an amount of $4,000.00 from the proceeds 
of the sale of the gravel lands. 
B. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE FIND-
ING IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL. 
Even if it be determined that the Plaintiff's Com-
plaint sounds in law rather than in equity, the evidence 
before the trial court is insufficient to support its finding 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive a net amount of 
$24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale to the State of 
Utah. 
This court, although consistently refusing to weigh 
the evidence in cases at law, has nevertheless determined 
that in such cases, a finding and judgment of the lower 
court will not be permitted to stand unless it can be 
shown that such are supported by substantial evidence. 
San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co. v. Bd. of Education of Salt 
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A. Yes. Bud (Plaintiff) was to repay the loan 
(bracketed phrase added) · 
Q. This was the loan from State Savings~ 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 121) 
"At the time the actual mortgage was taken out 
Bud was to pay the payments .... " (R. 122) 
Inquiry was made of Mrs. Nebeker specifically with 
regard to the responsibility for the making of the pay-
ment to procure the partial release of mortgage. 
"Q. Now, Mrs. Nebeker, what disposition was to 
be made of the mortgage at State Savings from 
the proceeds of this sale, who was responsible to 
pay off the mortgage~ (Emphasis added) 
A. Bud Grant was responsible to make the 
monthly payments on the mortgage." (R. 130) 
'' Q. Do you recall what was said by Marvin 
Jones, and by the Plaintiff incident to this 
matter? 
A. Yes. That all proceeds from any sale would 
have to go first to State Savings and Loan if 
they gave the mortgage to pay off the mortgage 
for a partial release to State Savings and Loan 
before any other proceeds would be divided, .and 
this partial release then would be out of the first 
monies received, which would be going to Bud, 
because this would be Bud's obligation, becaw;e 
Biid was supposed to make the payments, the 
remainder would have gone to Bud up to the point 
where the profit area took place for Marv, a~d 
the ... (expenses of) sale which was the comnu~­
sion which should have gone to me." (Emphasis 
and bracketed phrase added) (R. 150) 
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$20,000.00 was paid to State Savings and Loan Associa-
tion (R. 105) leaving a balance of $26,625.00. Only an 
amount of $2,625.00 would have remained after a pay-
ment of $24,000.00 to Plaintiff. From this amount of 
$2,625.00, Marvin Jones would have remained obligated 
to pay all expenses of sale, including a realtor's commis-
sion. (R. 150) A standard six percent real estate com-
mission would have been in excess of the funds remaining 
in his hands. It is difficult to comprehend that Marvin 
Jones would have agreed to assist Plaintiff in this en-
deavor over a number of years, personally obligate him-
self on a mortgage, make payments thereon said mort-
gage and negotiate a sale of part of the land in question, 
all for no significant consideration, and in addition, face 
the possibility of having to dig into his own pocket to 
pay a part of any sales commission incurred on the sale. 
Defendant submits that there is no substantial evi-
dence to support trial court's finding that the Plaintiff 
was entitled to receive a net amount of $24,000.00 from 
the proceeds of the sale to the State, and therefore, peti-
tions this court to modify that finding, accordingly. 
POINT II 
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL ON PART OF THE ISSUES, CONSTITUTED 
ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRE-
TION. 
After judgment was obtained below, Defendant 
moved the trial court to amend that judgment insofar as 
it awarded a money judgment to Plaintiff. The Motion 
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Lake City, 32 Utah 305, 90 P. 565; James v. Robertson 
' 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068; Dansak v. DeLuke, 12 Utah 2d 
302, 366 P.2d 67. 
Heretofore set forth in this brief is the evidence be-
fore the trial court bearing upon the responsibility for the 
making of the payment necessary to procure the partial 
release of mortgage. It clearly establishes that the Plain-
tiff was responsible for the payment of the mortgage 
loan against the property. The record is clearly devoid 
of any evidence that would indicate mortgage payments 
were to have been made by Marvin Jones or the Defend-
ant. Admittedly, Marvin Jones was to pay the expenses 
incurred in making the sale to the State of Utah. There 
was no testimony before the court, however, indicating 
that the parties contemplated that the $20,000.00 payment 
made on the mortgage to obtain the partial release, was 
an expense of sale to have been born by Marvin Jones. 
To the contrary, the only testimony in which direct refer-
ence was made to the payment made to obtain the partial 
release, was that given by Mrs. Nebeker, to which we 
again refer. 
" ... and this partial release then would be out of 
the first monies received, which would be going 
to Bud (Plaintiff), because this woidd be Bud's 
obligation, because Bud was supposed to make the 
payments, .... " (Bracketed phrase and Em-
phasis Added) (R. 150) 
There is an absence of any evidence which would 
sustain a finding that the Plaintiff was to take a net 
$24,000.00 of the sale proceeds. Such could not reason-
ably have been the agreement of the parties. A total of 
$4G,G25.00 "·as paid b~- the State (R. 72) from which 
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order a m•w trial npon a motion groundPd in an immffi-
ciency of evidence, the lower court determination will be 
permitted to stand only if there is some substantial evi-
dence in support of the finding under attack. Lehi Irri-
qation Co. v. Moy.le, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; Valiotis v. 
Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Moser 
c. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 
136. In the Moser case the court said: 
''The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down by 
this court, is that where a motion for a new trial 
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, the trial court will not be held 
to have abused its discretion in denying the mo-
tion unless there is no substantial evidence in the 
record to sitpport the verdict." (Emphasis added) 
114 Utah 66. 
There is in fact no substantial evidence in the record 
to support the trial court's finding that from the land 
sale, the Plaintiff was to receive $24,000.00 over and 
above the amount paid to procure the partial release of 
the mortgage on the acreage so sold. As heretofore dis-
enssed under Point I herein, the only evidence received 
with reference to this issue was the testimony of Plain-
tiff's witness, Myrna Nebeker. She clearly testified that 
any and all mortgage payments were to have been the 
obligation of the Plaintiff. Her testimony as to the re-
~ponsibility of Marvin Jones to pay the expenses of sale 
did not in any way indicate that the parties had contem-
plated that the sum to be paid in procuring the partial 
release of mortgage was such an expense of sale. Clearly, 
and again as heretofore indicated, such an obligation is 
in no way characteristic of what is normally understood 
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was grounded upon the premise that the evidence was not 
sufficient to justify, among other things, a finding that 
Plaintiff was <>ntitled to receive a net amount of 
$24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of part of the 
subject land to the State of Utah. In the alternative, the 
court was requested to grant Defendant a new trial on 
the issue of the net amount which Plaintiff was to hare 
received from that sale. The court entered its Order 
amending the findings of fact and judgment in a number 
of regards, but refused to amend judgment with regard 
to the net amount to have been received by Plaintiff from 
the sale to the State of Utah and, further, denied the 
motion for new trial. Defendant submits that the failure 
to grant a new trial on this issue constituted an abuse of 
judicial discretion. 
Defendant is cognizant of the wide judicial discretion 
afforded the trial court in granting or denying a motion 
for a new trial predicated upon insufficiency of the evi-
dence, and that the trial court determination will not be 
disturhPd absent a clear abuse of discretion. As held hy 
this court in White t'. Union Pacific Railway Co., 8 Utah 
56, 29 P.1030: 
"The rule is, when a motion is made for a new 
trial because of the insufficiency of the evidence 
and the testimony is conflicting, the granting or 
refusing (of) a new trial is largely in the discre-
tion of the trial court, and its acts >vill not be 
overrnl,:>d unless there is a clear abuse of dis-
cretion." (Bracket word added) 8 Utah 57 
In applying the doctrine enunciated in the White 
Case, this court has further dete>rmined that as concerns 
an appeal taken from tlw failure of the trial court to 
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The trial court refused to consider the affidavit incident 
to Defendant's motion. 
Defendant submits that the refusal of the trial court 
to grant her motion for a new trial relative to the amount 
Plaintiff was to receive from the sale to the State of 
Utah, together with the failure of the court to consider 
the affidavit of Myrna Nebeker submitted in support of 
said motion, constituted an abuse of judicial discretion, 
there being no tmbstantial evidence in the record to sup-
port the finding subject of the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of 
the trial court, insofar as it awards the Plaintiff a net 
amount of $24,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of a 
portion of the subject land to the State of Utah, should 
be modified by this court, so as to reflect an award to 
Plaintiff of only a net amount of $4,000.00 from the pro-
ceeds of said sale, and in the alternative, that this court 
should grant Appellant a new trial on that issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BETTIL YON & HOW ARD 
Gary A. Weston 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
& Appellant 
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to represent a sales expense. On the only occasion that 
she addressed herself directly to the question of who was 
to make the subject payment, the said witness empha. 
sized that all payments on the mortgage were Plaintiff's 
responsibility. (R. 150) Nowhere in the record is it in-
dicated that the Defendant's decedent was responsible for 
the payment of the amount necessary to procure the 
partial release of mortgage. 
In support of her motion to amend judgment or for 
a new trial, Defendant procured the affidavit of Plain-
tiff's witness, Myrna Nebeker, and filed the same with 
the trial court. The only evidence going directly to the 
issue with which we are herein concerned, was Mrs. 
Nebeker's testimony as is reflected at R. 150 of the 
record. The affidavit was intended to assi,st the court in 
understanding that testimony should it have any question 
as to wha!t the witness meant thereby. Therein the affida-
vit, the witness deposed: 
'' ... plaintiff and Marvin L. Jones did orally 
agree that the plaintiff was to receive an amount 
of $3,000.00 per acre from the proceeds of any 
sale of the gravel acreage of the subjeet property, 
from which amount, plaintiff was to pay the. 
amoitnts necessary to procure the release of 
mortgage on the acreage so sold; that all proceeds 
over and above $3,000.00 per acre were to be 
received by Marvin L. Jones as his portion of tl1e 
sale proceeds from which he was to pay all 0th.er 
expenses of sale, including a real estate comm1~­
sion and any remaining amounts would be his 
sole earnings from the transaction." 
(Emphasis Added) (R. 77, 78) 
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